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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California1 made na-
tional headlines2 when it was announced in late June of 2014.  Chief 
Justice John Roberts’ opinion, for an all-but-unanimous3 Court, de-
clared that a search of the data available on a smart phone4 required 
a warrant issued by a judge.5  According to the opinion, these devices 
functioned as far more than phones.  While capable of a making a 
traditional telephone call, they also operated as cameras, electronic 
calendars, video recorders, GPS devices, rolodexes, audio recorders, 
and diaries; in every way, they performed as extremely capable pock-
et-sized computers, storing millions of pages of text, thousands of 
photographs and video recordings, and thousands of web searches 
going back years.6  In addition, they may contain data such as GPS 
coordinates, requested directions, appointment calendars, and other 
information that would allow the state to construct a highly detailed 
depiction of the activities of the user for a considerable time in the 
past, as well as a mosaic of the user’s personal interests, relationships, 
medical conditions, and the like.7  The Court did not view the phone 
as a mere physical object; rather, it said, the phone performs as a dig-
ital tool as multifunctional as a Swiss Army knife, and as a massive 
storage unit, for all of the user’s present and past digital life.  Given 
the deep privacy concerns such technology raised, law enforcement 
would henceforth need a warrant to burrow into this rich trove of 
material.8  Chief Justice Roberts conceded that smart phones had, in-
deed, “become important tools” for “criminal enterprises,” and 
searching the devices would no doubt provide incriminating evi-
dence.  The Court’s decision would therefore have a negative impact 
“on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.”9  But this did 
not, and should not, change the outcome.  “Privacy,” the Chief Jus-
tice said, “comes at a cost”10—a sentiment that no doubt surprised 
many observers of the Supreme Court’s cases involving police power 
over the last several decades. 
 
 1 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (decided with United States v. Wurie, No. 13-
212 (decided June 25, 2014)). 
 2 Jess Bravin, Supreme Court:  Police Need Warrants to Search Cellphone Data, WALL ST. J. (June 
25, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/high-court-police-usually-need-warrants-for-cell-
phone-data-1403706571; Adam Liptak, Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones, N.Y. 
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Deep in the opinion, exploring the considerable privacy interests 
at stake in a police search of a smart phone, the Court admitted that 
these concerns went further than just the data stored on the device.   
[T]he data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be 
stored on the device itself . . . . [The device may be] used to access data 
located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.  That is what cell phones, with 
increasing frequency, are designed to do by taking advantage of “cloud 
computing.”11 
Cloud computing, the Court explained, allows any device connected 
to the Internet to “display data stored on remote servers rather than 
on the device itself[,]” without knowing the difference.12  The scale of 
the privacy interests in such a massive amount of data available re-
motely makes it inconceivable, the Court said, that any standard ex-
ception to the warrant requirement (such as the search incident to 
arrest doctrine) could justify a search of all of the data accessible 
through the device. 
The Court’s discussion of how cloud computing makes the unlim-
ited capacity of the digital world accessible from any smart phone 
surely makes sense.  But this exploration of cloud computing does 
something more than just illustrate the vast scope of private data 
searchable in the digital realm:  it brings the Court face to face with 
the shortcomings of the third-party search doctrine. 
The third-party search doctrine arose in two cases from the 1970s:  
United States v. Miller13 and Smith v. Maryland.14  In both cases, the gov-
ernment sought access to the private information of a defendant:  in 
Miller, it took banking records by using a subpoena;15 in Smith, it ob-
tained the numbers dialed from defendant’s telephone by using a de-
 
TIMES, June 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/supreme-court-
cellphones-search-privacy.html?_r=0. 
 3 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 4 Chief Justice Roberts defined a smart phone as “a cell phone with a broad range of other 
functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet 
connectivity.”  Id. at 2480. 
 5 Id. at 2495. 
 6 Id. at 2479, 2487–92. 
 7 Id. at 2487–92. 
 8 Id. at 2495. 
 9 Id. at 2493. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 2491. 
 12 Id. 
 13 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 14 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 15 Miller, 425 U.S. at 438. 
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vice called a pen register.16  In neither case did the government ob-
tain a search warrant before getting the information.  The Court used 
Miller and Smith to say that no one could have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information willingly conveyed to a third party.  
When a person conveyed information to a third party—a bank’s cus-
tomer to a bank, in order to use a checking account, or a telephone 
user to the telephone company, in the form of numbers dialed for 
the purpose of making a connection to another phone—the person 
“takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the infor-
mation will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”17  This 
remains true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”18 
This line of reasoning made little sense when it appeared in the 
1970s.  To participate in the basics of modern life, like banking and 
using a telephone, a person essentially forfeited any Fourth Amend-
ment expectation of privacy in any information that the receiving in-
stitution might obtain as part of any transaction.  One could not 
maintain privacy rights in relation to the government except by giv-
ing up any interaction with any entity, public or private, that used or 
processed one’s data.  But in today’s world, the very idea of the third-
party doctrine seems downright absurd.  All aspects of participation 
in the digital worlds of commerce, entertainment, and everything else 
require—indeed, they depend upon—conveying data to an interme-
diary third-party organization.  Yet the third-party doctrine still stands 
and its implications become breathtaking in scope.  Digital privacy 
simply disappears. 
But with Riley, perhaps a crack has appeared in this façade—one 
that will inevitably widen, and at last get rid of the outdated and per-
nicious third-party doctrine.  This is because the whole idea behind 
the doctrine—that giving any information to anyone else means that 
law enforcement can search or seize it—must yield to the Court’s 
(correct) understanding of the use of data from the cloud, as articu-
lated in Riley.  If the use and availability of cloud-based data makes for 
a vastly expanded privacy interest, and therefore adds to the justifica-
tion of the need for a search warrant before searching the data ex-
posed by a user’s smart phone, the third-party doctrine has outlived 
whatever usefulness it once might have had.  Cloud-based data is, by 
 
 16 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 17 Id. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
 18 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
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its very nature, conveyed to and possessed by third parties.  That is 
both its function and its rasion d’être.  If we now live in the world of 
the cloud, and that world enjoys Fourth Amendment protection, as 
Riley says, the Court must now recognize the third-party doctrine for 
the relic it has become and cast it aside. 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court seems ready to dump 
the third-party doctrine.  It has said nothing of the sort, and it actual-
ly cited Smith v. Maryland in the Riley opinion.19  But the seeds of the 
argument appear in Riley, and they seem likely to sprout and grow. 
I.  RILEY V. CALIFORNIA:  WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR SMART PHONE SEARCHES, AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THE CLOUD 
A.  A Search Incident to a Valid Arrest:  Balancing Government Need Against 
the Intrusion on Individual Privacy 
In Riley, the United States Supreme Court confronted a situation 
that police encounter more and more often.  In both cases, police 
made arrests, and performed standard searches of the suspects inci-
dent to that arrest.  Officers seized smart phones during these 
searches, and then searched the data on the phones.20 These searches 
produced incriminating evidence, which both defendants moved to 
suppress; courts denied these motions, and both defendants suffered 
convictions.21 
The government attempted to justify the searches of the data in 
the smart phones under the “well accepted” exception to the warrant 
requirement for searches incident to a lawful arrest.22  In Riley, the 
Court explained that this exception rests on three related prece-
dents.23  In Chimel v. California,24 involving an arrest inside a home, 
the Supreme Court decided that police may search the area of the 
home that is within the arrestee’s immediate control, but no other 
areas.25  In United States v. Robinson,26 the Court said that the risks of 
any arrestee obtaining a weapon and the destruction of evidence in-
here in all arrests, justifying searches incident to arrest that allow po-
 
 19 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014)(citing Smith, 442 U.S. 735). 
 20 Id. at 2477–79. 
 21 Id. at 2481. 
 22 Id. at 2482. 
 23 Id. at 2483. 
 24 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 25 Id. at 763, 768. 
 26 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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lice to check the arrestee’s pockets and items within them even when 
there is no specific threat to officers or concern about the loss of evi-
dence.27  And in Arizona v. Gant,28 the Court filled out the picture in 
the context of vehicles:  it permitted the search of a car when the ar-
restee remains unsecured and within reaching distance of the pas-
senger compartment, or whenever an officer might reasonably be-
lieve that the vehicle might contain evidence of a crime.29 
The Court’s opinion in Riley rejected the idea that the police 
could search the contents of a smart phone found in the pocket of an 
arrestee, just as police who had searched a cigarette packet found in a 
pocket could in Robinson.  The Court balanced the extent to which 
the police need to search in order to promote legitimate government 
interests against “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy.”30  The Court found that neither of the risks ar-
ticulated in Chimel—the risk of access to a weapon or the risk of the 
destruction of evidence—could justify the search of the data in the 
phone without a warrant.31  The opinion found little reason to think 
that either the phone itself, or the data within, could constitute a 
weapon; the police could address any contingent danger—e.g., that 
the data might indicate that the suspect’s confederates might ap-
proach—with case-specific exceptions, such as the exception for exi-
gent circumstances.32  Similarly, the Court dismissed any danger to 
the evidence, such as the possibility of “remote wiping” of the data or 
of data encryption.33  Law enforcement could meet these dangers, 
should they exist, with technologies of its own or other measures.34 
On the other side of the balance, the capabilities of smart phones 
made searches of the data on these devices uniquely intrusive, be-
cause searchers would have access to an unprecedented amount of 
information.  The government’s argument had ignored this techno-
logical reality, saying that the search of the data on a cell phone did 
not differ materially from searches of physical items such as wallets or 
purses, but the Court would have none of it.  “That is like saying a 
ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon. . . . Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy con-
 
 27 Id. at 235, 236. 
 28 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 29 Id. at 353. 
 30 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31 Id. at 2485. 
 32 Id. at 2485–86. 
 33 Id. at 2486. 
 34 Id. at 2486–88. 
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cerns far beyond” the search of any objects found in an arrestee’s 
pockets or on his or her person.35 
First, the word “phone” does not accurately describe these devices.  
Rather, the Court said, think of them as “minicomputers” capable of 
making telephone calls, but equally capable as “cameras, video play-
ers, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers,” making them qualitatively different 
than other objects a person might carry.36  Second, this wide-ranging 
capability comes with “immense storage capacity,” enabling the typi-
cal smart phone to store and carry an amount of information that 
people simply could not, were the data in physical form.37  Third, as a 
consequence of the portable storage of such an immense amount of 
data in so many forms (pictures, messages, photos, and videos, etc.), 
the data “reveal much more in combination than any isolated rec-
ord,” enabling the reconstruction of “[t]he sum of an individual’s 
private life,” both present and past (back to the dates on which the 
first data was stored).38  Fourth, the use of smart phones has become 
so pervasive that few Americans do not have these devices on their 
persons at any given time.39  Fifth, smart phones collect and store 
qualitatively different data than any file cabinet could:  Internet 
browsing histories, GPS location data timed to the minute, personal 
messages to intimates, and the user’s substantive interests (the Court 
mentions political affiliation, addictions, pregnancy or other health 
issues, religion, and personal finance).40  In sum, a search of cell 
phone data would expose virtually every aspect of a user’s life; in-
deed, it would “expose to the government far more than the most ex-
haustive search of a house.”41 
Comparing the government’s minimal-to-nonexistent interest in 
searching for weapons or protecting evidence with the enormous in-
trusion on the arrestee’s privacy involved in a warrantless search of 
the data on a cell phone, the Court declared that a search of a cell 
phone’s data required a warrant.42  But the Court added one other 
 
 35 Id. at 2488. 
 36 Id. at 2489. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that such massive data collection about one’s location “may ‘alter the relation-
ship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic society’”). 
 39 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
 40 Id. at 2490. 
 41 Id. at 2491 (emphasis in original). 
 42 Id. at 2493. 
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factor into the mix:  remote data storage and use, also called cloud 
computing. 
B.  Cloud Computing 
Without the user knowing it, smartphones use “data located else-
where.”43  This occurs not as an anomaly, but as standard operating 
procedure; manufacturers equip smartphones to engage in cloud 
computing.  According to the Court, “[c]loud computing is the ca-
pacity of Internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote 
servers rather than on the device itself.  Cell phone users often may 
not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in 
the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”44 
The Court noted that the government had conceded that the 
search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant require-
ment would not cover data stored in the cloud.45  Indeed, the gov-
ernment could not have said anything else without looking foolish; to 
argue otherwise would be “like finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and 
arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a 
house.”46  In fact, said the Justices, police officers searching the data 
on the phone would not usually know whether or not what they 
found came from inside the phone itself, or from the cloud.47 
The Court’s definition of cloud computing, along with its expla-
nation of cloud computing’s importance in deciding whether to re-
quire a warrant, makes eminent sense.  First, we can tell that the 
Court correctly understands how accessing data remotely actually 
works.  This allows future courts to make correct decisions with as-yet-
unknown technology, because understanding what the Court in Riley 
values requires an accurate factual picture.  If the Court misses the 
mark in its understanding of technological facts or chooses to ignore 
what actually makes a new technology important, its rationale will 
necessarily be unclear to judges looking back on the opinion.  The 
Court has not always succeeded in this respect in other recent opin-
ions.  For example, in United States v. Jones,48 decided just two years 
earlier, the Court had before it the question of whether placing a 
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a vehicle for twenty-
 
 43 Id. at 2491. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
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eight days, generating a complete locational record for a full month, 
constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Justice Anto-
nin Scalia’s opinion for the Court did not center on the fact that 
tracking the vehicle’s location around the clock for twenty-eight days 
intruded on individual privacy, enabling the police to build a detailed 
picture of the driver’s movements.  (This would have paralleled the 
Court’s statement in Riley that using a large amount of data allows the 
authorities to reconstruct “the sum of an individual’s private life.”49)  
Rather, Justice Scalia decided that the key element of the Fourth 
Amendment intrusion was the placing of an object—the GPS de-
vice—on the vehicle, because this constituted a trespass on the de-
fendant’s property (the vehicle).50  And in Maryland v. King,51 in 
which the Court upheld a state law that allowed police to take DNA 
samples from arrested people52 without waiting for a conviction, Jus-
tice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion rested, in part, on the fact that 
police needed DNA testing at the point of arrest in order to deter-
mine the arrestee’s identity.53  The majority came to this conclusion 
despite the fact that determining identity from a DNA sample takes 
weeks or months using current technology, and would therefore not 
help police in trying to identify a suspect for the purposes of arrest.54 
Second, and more important for present purposes, the Court’s 
opinion in Riley described cloud computing or remote data storage 
accurately enough that we can understand how it works and there-
fore how it fits into our lives, and therefore how it fits into our expec-
tations of privacy.  The data, the Court said, does not reside in the 
phone itself; it sits on another, much larger computer, somewhere 
else, which does not belong to the user.  And it is this quality that 
emerges as a direct challenge to the third-party doctrine. 
 
 49 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 50 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  While the decision looks like a failure to understand what GPS 
tracking does and how it works, it may be that Justice Scalia simply preferred to ignore 
this in favor of a rationale which he felt had greater appeal as a matter of doctrine. 
 51 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–71 (2013). 
 52 Id. at 1965–66. 
 53 Id. at 1971. 
 54 See, e.g., New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, How to Submit a Case, 
NYC.GOV (Jan. 16, 2016), www.nycgov.html/ocme/html/hss/how_to_submit_acase
_shtml (“A report describing the result of testing will be issued with 120 days of evidence 
receipt . . . .”). 
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II.  THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE:  AN IDEA WHOSE TIME NEVER CAME, 
AND WHOSE TIME IS CERTAINLY OVER 
The third-party doctrine emerged in the 1970s in two cases that 
created greater power for police investigators.  These decisions 
seemed to take everyday interactions and turn them into excuses for 
government overreaching.  But if that was true when the Court hand-
ed down these opinions, it is much more true now. 
A.  The Cases:  Miller and Smith 
The third-party issue first arose in United States v. Miller,55 in which 
the government sought banking records belonging to the defendant:  
checks, deposit slips, and the like.  The government went after the 
records, not through a search or seizure with a warrant, as in the 
normal course of an investigation, but instead by issuing subpoenas 
to two banks that the defendant used.56  The banks maintained these 
records under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,57 but they turned the 
records over to the government anyway, and prosecutors then used 
those records to convict the defendant.58  The defendant objected to 
the use of the records against him, arguing that the government had 
violated his reasonable expectations of privacy in those records by 
seizing them without a warrant.59 
The Supreme Court sided with the government, saying that the 
defendant had no privacy rights in his own banking records.60  Most 
people might regard their own personal financial records as private, 
especially with the Bank Secrecy Act in play.  But that did not matter 
to the Justices.  Rather, the Court based its decision on the fact that 
the defendant had conveyed his private information to his banks.61  
Any exposure of private information to a third party, the Court said, 
defeated any possible claim that the defendant could claim any priva-
cy right in the information shared.62  “[W]e perceive no legitimate 
‘expectation of privacy’” in the records or their contents, the Court 
said.63 
 
 55 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
 56 Id. at 437–38. 
 57 Id. at 440–41. 
 58 Id. at 437–38. 
 59 Id. at 442. 
 60 Id. at 444–45. 
 61 Id. at 442. 
 62 Id. at 442–43. 
 63 Id. at 442. 
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The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern-
ment. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Govern-
ment authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption 
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed 
in the third party will not be betrayed.64 
In short, said the Court, “no Fourth Amendment interests of the 
[defendant] are implicated here,”65 notwithstanding that the infor-
mation came to the bank with the understanding that it would re-
main confidential.  Such an understanding might seem like the very 
essence of an “expectation of privacy,” yet the Court says, in effect, 
that such an expectation could not be reasonable.  By conveying his 
information to a third party—his bank—the defendant “takes the 
risk” that the bank will betray him to the government, simply because 
the bank could betray him. 
This notion seems curious indeed.  Information in the hands of 
one’s bank differs greatly from information one might tell a friend or 
acquaintance, which the friend might repeat to others.  Rather, it 
constitutes private information about one’s finances—income 
earned, debts paid, amounts owed, the far-too-small nest egg because 
of poor savings habits.  Most people would not share this kind of in-
formation widely, if at all.  If one had told a very close friend about 
these matters, one would likely feel deeply uncomfortable if this 
friend had conversations with others—gossiping, if you will—about 
such private matters.  To call personal finances “private matters” may 
seem to simply assume the correctness of the answer with which the 
Court disagrees.  Nevertheless, the reaction of most people to finding 
out that a bank had shared personal financial information would be 
simple:  get a new bank.  In this situation, expecting privacy could on-
ly be reasonable. 
Consider a brief thought experiment.  Imagine two customers in 
the marketplace seeking banking services.  One bank advertises in the 
traditional ways, calling itself friendly, oriented toward customer ser-
vice, and dedicated to paying the best rates possible and charging the 
lowest fees.  The second bank advertises the same features, in slightly 
different words.  But it also adds that customers should not expect 
their financial information to remain confidential, especially vis-á-vis 
a government request, because everyone knows that, in any relation-
ship, one party may betray the confidence of the other.  It seems in-
 
 64 Id. at 443 (citations omitted). 
 65 Id. at 444. 
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conceivable that anyone would choose the second bank over the first.  
While it is understandable that individuals might disclose the secrets 
of those who have confided in them, knowing that a bank would do 
so seems like a deal-breaker. 
We have seen this very phenomenon recently in a different indus-
try.  Major information and telecommunications companies in the 
United States, such as Google, Verizon, Apple, and Facebook, faced 
major questions from non-U.S. customers in 2013 and 2014 when dis-
closures by former National Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor Ed-
ward Snowden revealed that these firms had regularly cooperated 
with NSA requests for data on their customers’ telecommunications 
activity.66  If Americans did not mind that the NSA vacuumed up their 
private information, and this activity broke no laws or social norms in 
the United States, fine.  But customers outside the United States did 
not want this happening to their information,67 and these American 
companies correctly saw this as a threat to their overseas business.68  
Apple was among the first to react, announcing that henceforth, us-
ing a password on its newest iPhones would automatically encrypt the 
contents of the phone; the company would not have the key to the 
code, and therefore could not decrypt anything for the government.69  
The Director of the FBI publicly attacked Apple for this move,70 and 
others in law enforcement told the media that the iPhone would now 
serve as the phone of choice for pedophiles and other criminals.71  
But the market had spoken, and Apple and other companies listened 
to their customer and held their ground. 
The Supreme Court revisited the third-party doctrine again just 
three years later, in Smith v. Maryland.72  After a female victim was 
robbed, she began to get distressing telephone calls from a man iden-
tifying himself as the robber.73  When police obtained information 
 
 66 Charlie Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html. 
 67 Anton Troianovski & Danny Yadron, German Government Ends Verizon Contract, WALL ST. J. 
(June 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-government-ends- verizon-   con-
tract -14038022 26. 
 68 Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-
hurting- bottom-line-of-tech- companies.html. 
 69 Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI blasts Apple, Google For Locking Police Out of Phones, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/technology/2014
/09/   25/68c   4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 73 Id. at 737. 
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that connected the defendant with the robbery and the calls, they 
had the telephone company install a device called a “pen register” at 
its central offices.  The device would record the numbers dialed from 
the defendant’s home phone number.74  The police did not obtain a 
warrant or any other court order before installing the pen register.75  
The device revealed a call from the defendant’s number to the home 
of the victim on one of the dates that the victim had received such a 
call, and based on that fact and other evidence, the police obtained a 
search warrant for the defendant’s home.76  The defendant moved to 
suppress all of the evidence recovered in this search, because the po-
lice obtained it by using the pen register without a warrant.77  The tri-
al court denied the motion to suppress, and all of the evidence from 
the search helped to convict the defendant.78 
The Supreme Court began with the basics:  whether or not the 
Fourth Amendment applies in any given situation, the Court said, 
“depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 
‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ 
that has been invaded by government action.”79  The defendant’s ar-
gument, the Court said, that he had a legitimate expectation of priva-
cy in the numbers dialed from his home telephone was not correct.  
Citing United States v. Miller, the Court said that even if the defendant 
himself did expect the numbers he dialed would remain secret, such 
an expectation was not reasonable because “a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”80  Like the bank depositor in Miller who chose to give 
his private financial information to his bank, the defendant “voluntar-
ily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 
‘exposed’ that information to [the telephone company’s] equip-
ment.”81  By doing this, the Court concluded that the defendant “as-
sumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers 
he dialed,” equating the entirely electronic and mechanical switching 
equipment the telephone company was using to the human operators 
who used to connect phone calls for people in the past.82  And hu-
mans, of course, could spill secrets. 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 737–38. 
 79 Id. at 740. 
 80 Id. at 743–44. 
 81 Id. at 744. 
 82 Id. 
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B.  The Origin of the Idea that a Bank Customer or Telephone Dialer 
“Assumes the Risk” 
Reading the opinions in both Miller and Smith, one striking fea-
ture stands out:  their reliance on the idea that a person who conveys 
information to a third party “assumes the risk” that the third party 
may disclose that information to another.  The genesis of that idea 
illuminates how poorly the third-party doctrine itself fits within our 
constitutional framework. 
The idea that one “assumes the risk” of a given activity or action 
comes from torts:  the part of Anglo-American law that governs civil 
liability for noncriminal injuries incurred when one individual or or-
ganization harms another.  Accurately used, the phrase “assumes the 
risk”—usually, assumption of the risk—referred to a defense to a tort 
claim.83  A defendant in a tort case could argue, under proper facts, 
that a plaintiff’s claim should not succeed, because the plaintiff knew 
of the dangerous condition at the heart of the case, and chose to ex-
pose himself to it anyway. 84  By doing so, the plaintiff assumed the 
risk inherent in the activity, and cannot now complain that he or she 
experienced injury because of the defendant.85  For example, imagine 
A asks B if A can bring his square dancing club to the hayloft in B’s 
barn for a hoe-down on Saturday night.  B says:  “Sure, but you better 
think about it first—the floor is rotted through in a bunch of places.”  
A goes up to the loft to have a look, sees the weak floorboards, and 
while striding across the loft anyway, falls through the wood in the 
floor, injuring his spine.  A sues B for damages, but B will have a de-
fense:  A knew of the risk (he saw the loft floor had been weakened by 
rot), but went ahead with his inspection of the loft anyway, thereby 
knowingly and voluntarily assuming the risk of walking across the 
floor and suffering an injury. 
The assumption of the risk doctrine makes sense in torts; one 
should not have to compensate another for damages when the other 
person knowingly exposed himself to danger.  But the doctrine does 
not seem an intuitively obvious fit in the realm of constitutional crim-
inal procedure.  And its first appearance in modern criminal proce-
dure law illustrates this.  In Lopez v. United States,86 a case decided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1963, the defendant made incriminating 
 
 83 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORT:  CASES AND MATERIALS 590 (8th ed. 1988) (“In most 
states the defense of assumption of risk [applies] to all negligence cases.”). 
 84 Id. at 590–91. 
 85 Id. 
 86 373 U.S. 427, 427 (1963). 
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statements while attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) agent who was carrying a hidden recording device.87  The 
agent had not obtained a warrant before recording the conversa-
tion.88  The Supreme Court’s majority opinion refused to recognize 
any infringement of the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant 
by the government, saying the defendant simply took an unwise risk.89  
In dissent, Justice William Brennan argued that the Court had made 
a mistake:  the majority assumed that the Fourth Amendment only 
protected information held in secrecy, and therefore the only way to 
have Fourth Amendment protection for one’s private thoughts would 
be to keep them private—from everyone, all the time.90  In the course 
of that argument, Justice Brennan imported the assumption of the 
risk doctrine into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
[The defendant] assumed the risk that his acquaintance would divulge 
their conversation . . . . The risk inheres in all communications which are 
not in the sight of the law privileged.  It is not an undue risk to ask per-
sons to assume, for it does no more than compel them to use discretion 
in choosing their auditors, to make damaging disclosures only to persons 
whose character and motives may be trusted.91 
Justice Brennan went on to say that the risk in cases like Lopez was not 
a risk of casual gossip that one might expect in the course of human 
relations.  Rather, it was the risk that a third party, like a government 
agent listening in on a private conversation, would later testify in 
court about the private conversation.92  This, Justice Brennan said, 
could not be justified under the idea that our acquaintances some-
times betray us to others.  It is, he said, a risk “of a different order.”93 
In two subsequent cases, a majority of the Court took Justice 
Brennan’s “assumption of the risk” language from his dissent in 
Lopez, and applied it to justify decisions that solidified the rule that 
conversations with government informants enjoyed no Fourth 
Amendment protection, even when the informant was a trusted 
friend of the defendant.94  But the portion of the Brennan dissent 
that filled out the full context—that while people must live with the 
 
 87 Id. at 430–31. 
 88 Id. at 430. 
 89 Id. at 439–40. 
 90 Id. at 449–50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 450.  While assumption of risk comes from torts, it is not clear that Justice Brennan 
meant to impart a tort concept.  Rather, he seems to be reacting to the majority’s use of 
the concept of risk.  See id. at 439. 
 92 Id. at 450. 
 93 Id. 
 94 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
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possibility of a confidant spilling their secrets, there should still be 
Fourth Amendment protection against government intrusions—does 
not appear.  In the first of these two cases, Hoffa v. United States,95 the 
federal government charged Teamsters Union leader Jimmy Hoffa 
and three associates in 1964 with jury tampering.96  An earlier case 
against Hoffa that took place in 1962, known as the Test Fleet trial, 
ended in a hung jury; the 1964 case alleged that Hoffa and his associ-
ates bribed Test Fleet jurors.  In the 1964 case, the government used 
evidence obtained by one Edward Partin, who was a government in-
formant, to obtain convictions of Hoffa and the others.  Partin, a 
friend and associate of Hoffa’s with his own substantial criminal his-
tory as well as pending state and federal criminal charges,97 gained 
admittance to Hoffa’s hotel suite during the Test Fleet trial; he posed 
as the same ally of Hoffa he had always been, when in fact he had be-
come an informant.98  After the government obtained convictions for 
jury tampering, Hoffa argued that placing a government informant 
within Hoffa’s private quarters and among his confidants, without a 
warrant, violated Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.99  The U.S. Supreme Court did not 
agree, ruling that Hoffa had no Fourth Amendment protections 
against the government’s use of informant Partin to gather infor-
mation about him, even though Hoffa’s hotel room would have been 
presumptively private.  Hoffa “was not relying on the security of the 
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin 
would not reveal his wrongdoing.”100  In making this argument, the 
Court majority turned to the dissenting opinion in Lopez by Justice 
Brennan.  “In the words of the dissenting opinion in Lopez,” said the 
majority in Hoffa, “‘the risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or 
betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with 
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human so-
ciety.  It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we 
speak.’”101  But the Hoffa majority omits Justice Brennan’s next sen-
tence, emphasizing that intrusion by the government constituted a 
 
 95 385 U.S. 293. 
 96 Id. at 294–95. 
 97 Id. at 296–98. 
 98 Id. at 296, 302. 
 99 Id. at 300.  Hoffa also argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had been violat-
ed.  Id. at 303–04. 
100 Id. at 302. 
101 Id. at 303 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing)). 
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risk “of a different order” and does, in fact, create a constitutional vi-
olation. 
The Supreme Court misused Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lopez 
again the following year, when the Court decided Katz v. United 
States,102 from which emerged the rule that searches or seizures violate 
the Fourth Amendment if they intrude upon reasonable expectations 
of privacy.103  The question then became whether the Lopez/Hoffa “as-
sumes the risk” idea survived the Katz decision.  In United States v. 
White,104 in 1971, the Supreme Court said that it did.  White, another 
case involving a government informant, gave the Court the oppor-
tunity to restate the “assumes the risk” rule.  “Inescapably,” the major-
ity said, 
[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his com-
panions may be reporting to the police.  If he sufficiently doubts their 
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never material-
ize.  But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, 
the risk is his.105 
From this brief survey of Lopez, Hoffa, and White, we learn some-
thing important about the purpose of this doctrinal transplantation 
from torts to criminal procedure.  The Court used the idea of as-
sumed risk to protect the ability of police to use informants.  The 
Fourth Amendment had taken on new life in the context of every day 
search and seizure cases.  Since Mapp v. Ohio,106 in 1961, the Court 
had applied the exclusionary rule to the states.  Henceforth, no court 
would countenance purposefully ignoring the Fourth Amendment.107  
After Katz and its reasonable expectation of privacy rules, one could 
not help but ask whether placing an informant into a suspect’s home 
or business to masquerade as a trusted friend violated those reasona-
ble expectations.  The continued use of informants, a tool used by 
police and state authorities since time immemorial, seemed about to 
collide head on with the Warren Court’s new criminal procedure.  In 
 
102 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
103 The “reasonable expectation of privacy” principle actually comes from Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion.  Id. at 361 (explaining “a twofold requirement” as “[f]irst that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”). 
104 401 U.S. 745. 
105 Id. at 752 (emphasis added). 
106 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
107 For an apt description of what this change meant to a rank and file police office, see 
Remo Franceschini, A MATTER OF HONOR:  ONE COP’S LIFELONG PURSUIT OF JOHN GOTTI 
AND THE MOB 36–37 (1993) (“All of a sudden . . . [y]ou had to have probable cause . . . . 
The exclusionary rule essentially shut down police procedure that had been going on for 
a hundred years.”). 
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order to legally allow continued use of informants, the Court’s major-
ity took Justice Brennan’s idea of assumed risk (which he did not in-
tend to apply to government action) and turned it on its head (to 
take away Fourth Amendment protection against government ac-
tion).  And it was the assumed risk idea that became part of the foun-
dation for the third-party doctrine, just a few short years after White. 
C.  The Third-Party Doctrine:  An Overreach the Day It Was Decided 
When we see that the third-party doctrine rests on a tort idea 
clumsily grafted into the law of criminal procedure, it becomes clear 
that this constitutes a shaky rationale for deciding questions of priva-
cy.  But the way the third-party doctrine fit into the world at the time 
of its creation in Miller and Smith made it something worse than a 
weak rationale.  Even in the 1970s, the third-party doctrine exposed 
people to government searches that, by any measure, intruded deeply 
into personal privacy. 
The 1970s long pre-dated our era of Internet communications; 
personal computers did not appear as a mass-produced, fully assem-
bled consumer items until the late 1970s and early 1980s.108  But even 
in the 1970s, anyone who wanted to engage in commerce or in the 
basic connections of social existence needed, at times, to pass infor-
mation to trusted persons or institutions.  Miller and Smith both make 
excellent examples.  Miller involved the use of checks:  written orders 
to an account holder’s own bank to pay to the order of a named per-
son a specified amount of money.109  The account holder uses the 
check—printed with the crucial information identifying the account 
holder’s bank (the routing number, as well as the name of the bank), 
the number of the (payor’s) account, from which funds will come, 
and also—filled in by the account holder—the name of the person to 
receive the money, and the amount of money.  All of this infor-
mation, contained on the check, serves as the set of instructions to a 
trusted third party (the account holder’s bank) to enable a transac-
tion to take place.  With modern banks and the banking system, an 
account holder could transfer large amounts of money and could do 
so far more safely and faster than if account holder had to use cash.  
This system enables the parties to more easily engage in greater 
numbers of commercial exchanges, big and small.  This, of course, 
increases commerce and stimulates activity of all kinds, creating both 
 
108 See Dan Knight, Personal Computer History:  The First 25 Years, LOW END MAC (Apr. 26, 
2014), http://lowendmac.com/2014/personal-computer-history-the-first-25-years/. 
109 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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societal and personal benefits.  Imagine, then, trying to exist in mod-
ern America without the advantages of banks taking and safeguarding 
our deposits, paying them out as we command, whenever and to 
whomever we demand.  We can, of course, exist in a cash economy, 
but its disadvantages are many:  the exposure to loss and crime alone, 
some of this crime potentially violent, makes a banking system 
worthwhile.  Yet under Miller, the price of modern banking includes 
the loss of any Fourth Amendment-based protection for the privacy of 
all information that one must disclose in order to engage in the most 
basic transactions.110  Most people would probably find this surprising:  
they would expect that the relationship with one’s bank, and infor-
mation about personal finances in particular, would be held in confi-
dence.  But Miller makes this information available to the government 
without the protection of a warrant issued by a judge.111 
Smith may be even more startling.  The pen register—a device that 
“records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling infor-
mation,”112 i.e., the numbers dialed by a caller—collected only this 
limited information; it did not record the content of calls.  Still, a 
complete list of all of the numbers one has dialed could give some-
one with that information considerable insight into daily activities, 
beliefs, and relationships.  With particular numbers, one could make 
reasonable guesses about a person’s health status (dialing one’s car-
diologist or oncologist, for example), religious affiliation (calls to 
one’s mosque or temple), romantic life (calling a paramour), sexual 
orientation (calling a same sex partner), whether or not one gambles 
(calls to a known bookmaker), or preference for intoxicating sub-
stances (calls to a known narcotics dealer).  Thus the numbers dialed 
can be invaluable in any effort to paint a picture of the dialer’s life, 
and could even create leverage—i.e., blackmail material—over the 
dialer. 
Certainly, one could live in the world without using a telephone in 
the 1970s; some people did (but usually because they could not af-
ford one).  But few would do this by choice if they could choose oth-
erwise.  By the 1970s, the telephone had become such a ubiquitous 
feature of life in the United States, 103 years after the invention of 
 
110 Id. at 442–43. 
111 Id. at 443. 
112 This definition comes from the federal law governing use of pen registers, particularly 18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3).  See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979)(defining the 
term “pen register”). 
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the device,113 that no business could exist without one.  Yet the price 
of using a telephone was that the government was absolutely unre-
strained in its ability to obtain information about whom a dialer had 
called.  As with banking, the use of something as basic as telephone 
communication required the surrender of a certain amount of 
Fourth Amendment rights, even forty years ago. 
Thinking back to the 1970s, the price of the third-party doctrine 
did not stop with Americans’ ability to keep private their bank rec-
ords or phone numbers dialed.  A quick thought back to that era easi-
ly produces a short list of disclosures that would also not be private 
under the third-party doctrine: 
· Transactions with utility companies to buy electric power, heating 
fuel, water, and the like, since information on the quantity of each used 
by the household must be conveyed to the utility; 
· Health information, when conveyed to an insurance company, a bill-
ing department in a medical services company, or the like; 
· Library books and other materials checked out under one’s card; 
· Information on education, such as which courses one has taken, 
grades received, or even school disciplinary records; or 
· Credit information. 
Of course, any of these types of information could receive protec-
tion under federal or state legislation.  For example, educational in-
formation now enjoys protection from disclosure under the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”).114  Information given 
to a health care professional (doctor or pharmacist, for example) is 
protected from disclosure under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).115  But statutory protections do not 
give anyone the type of protection afforded by the Constitution.  The 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures remains beyond reach under the third-party 
doctrine. 
III.  A DOCTRINE TOO BROAD IN THE 1970S HAS BECOME TODAY’S 
PRIVACY NIGHTMARE 
Let us leave the 1970s, and think about the place of the third-party 
doctrine in today’s world.  If sharing important information with 
 
113 Ben Zigterman, How We Stopped Communicating Like Animals:  15 Ways Phones Have Evolved, 
BGR (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://bgr.com/2013/12/13/telephone-timeline-a-brief-
history-of-the-phone/. 
114 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. 
115 See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502. 
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third parties such as banks and telephone companies had already be-
come hard to avoid by the 1970s, in today’s world no real options ex-
ist.  Across multiple dimensions of life, almost anything that does not 
require physical contact now happens through the Internet.  The 
ubiquity of the online world, in every sector of our activities, means 
that people can no longer avoid third-party contact involving the ex-
change of personal data.  In short, for the great majority of people in 
the United States today, much of life takes place online. 
Take a brief inventory of the activities of an average American’s 
daily life, and we see that the Internet plays a growing role in most of 
them.  While it is certainly possible not to use online capabilities for 
some activities, or to use them only sometimes, others have all-but-
completely transitioned to the online world, leaving the physical 
world as a less convenient, seldom used option. 
BANKING—Start with banking and telecommunications, the sub-
jects of Miller and Smith, respectively.  In 1973, one could not perform 
basic personal banking tasks—open an account, write or deposit a 
check, or withdraw funds, for example—without giving the (third 
party) bank information about the transaction in a way that, accord-
ing to the opinion in Miller, removed from the transaction any Fourth 
Amendment protection.  This remains true now, only more so.  For 
decades, banks have moved customers toward the use of electronical-
ly-connected intermediaries we call automatic teller machines 
(“ATMs”) and away from interaction with bank tellers.116  ATMs can 
now do almost anything a human teller can:  withdraw cash, check 
account balances, accept deposits and payments, and the like.117  For 
many bank customers, debit cards have supplanted cash and checks 
as the mode of point-of-sale payment; together, debit and credit card 
transactions have overtaken total cash and check payments.118  Bill 
payment may also run through banks and online services; millions of 
Americans list their regular payment recipients on the online sites 
 
116 See Lauren Abdel-Razzaq, Banks Redefine Role of Teller in Move Toward Technology, DETROIT 
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015, 11:12 PM), http://www.detroitnews. com/story/ business/ 2015/
02/27/  technology-changing-bank- teller-role/24156071/ (explaining that moves toward 
automated technology is “making it much less likely that a customer will interact with a 
human”). 
117 Constance Gustke, Speedy, New ATMs Get High-tech Makeover, BANKRATE.COM (Feb. 24, 
2014), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/banking/new-breed-of-atms-get-high-tech-
makeover.aspx. 
118 Jeremy M. Simon, Paper to Plastic:  Checks and Cash Losing To Debit and Credit, 
CREDITCARDS.COM  (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.  creditcards.com/credit -card-news/
debit-credit- card-preferred -payment-1271.php. 
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and use the sites to make their monthly payments.119  And of course, 
all of the information transmitted to third-party banks by individual 
customers and businesses comes through another third party:  Inter-
net service providers (“ISPs”).120  In short, almost any aspect of per-
sonal or commercial financial activity will involve giving personal data 
to a third party—sometimes more than one third party.  When deal-
ing with anything except cash, one simply cannot escape the rationale 
of Miller. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS—Like banking, the telecommunications 
industry—what we would have called the telephone companies in 
1979121—has become an even more significant recipient of third-party 
data than it was at the time of Smith.  In fact, in many practical ways, 
the telecommunications industry is the third party.  Telecommunica-
tion companies—including not just the descendants of the legacy te-
lephony carriers, but also cable companies (formerly cable television 
companies) and companies that focus on Internet communications—
are the intermediaries for virtually all of the commercial and person-
al communications of daily life.  These companies serve as the third-
parties for companies that, by themselves, would not necessarily have 
third party status.  For example, imagine a small business of almost 
any kind:  a specialty cigar store, or a gourmet food business, per-
haps.  Both of these businesses would likely have brick and mortar lo-
cations, at which a customer could come in, browse and locate goods, 
and pay in cash.  But today, many such businesses have online 
presences as well.  The cigar shop or the gourmet outlet can create a 
website, using online tools and hosted by an Internet service provid-
er.  The site will advertise the stores’ products, and sell their goods 
through the third-party web host, and will utilize third-party payment 
options (debit or credit card companies, non-cash, non-credit pay-
ment options like PayPal, or the like).  The customer will receive the 
physical product through shipping by yet another third party:  United 
Parcel Service, Federal Express, or the U.S. Postal Service, just to 
name a few options, all of whom share connections to the merchant 
through the Internet.  In each phase of these transactions, infor-
mation is flowing from the consumer to one or more businesses, 
through third-party telecommunications intermediaries.  In turn, the 
 
119 See Jane Bryant Quinn, Should I Pay Bills Online?, MONEYWATCH (Feb. 5, 2010, 11:38 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/online-bill-pay/ (explaining that millions of users enjoy 
the efficiency and security benefits of paying bills online). 
120 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
121 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (“[T]he pen register was installed on tele-
phone company property at the telephone company’s central offices . . . .”). 
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sellers of the goods use other businesses, such as shipping companies, 
to complete the transactions, and this generates yet more data flow-
ing through third-party telecommunications operations. 
RETAIL SALES—Amazon started in the 1990s as a company that 
sold books online, using credit cards or other electronic payment sys-
tems.  Amazon now sells almost any consumer product imaginable, 
delivered to the homes of its customers; streaming video entertain-
ment; and even server capacity for businesses.122  Amazon’s Internet-
based model has proven so successful that virtually all retail business-
es have had to reassess their business models.  Even Wal-Mart, the 
largest American retailer, has had to fight Amazon by enlarging its 
own Internet presence significantly.123  More to the point, all of this 
commerce, and the company’s astounding growth, has its basis in 
third-party transactions:  individual customers transmit information 
to third-party retailers like Amazon, including orders and payment 
information, and none of this has any Fourth Amendment protection 
under Miller and Smith. 
MEDICAL INFORMATION—For some years, both the government 
and large health care companies have moved toward electronic med-
ical records systems.124  Along with these changes, individual consum-
ers of health care may now manage the day-to-day aspects of 
healthcare through Internet portals.  For example, one typical medi-
cal insurance provider encourages all enrollees to use its electronic 
system for making and changing appointments, obtaining prescrip-
tion refills, receiving the results of diagnostic tests, and basic com-
munications with their doctors.125  Patients can access all of their med-
ical records through the system.  The system also encourages 
enrollees to use the system for medical consultation, for 24/7 online 
 
122 See BRAD STONER, THE EVERYTHING STORE:  JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON (Pro-
logue) (2013).  This last item does not, strictly speaking, constitute retail sales.  At this 
writing, Amazon makes growing shares of its revenues and operating income.  Neil McAl-
lister, Amazon Lifts Lid on AWS Money Factory, Says It’s A $5 BEEEELLION Biz, THE REGISTER 
(Apr. 23,  2015), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/23/amazon_q1_2015_earnings_cloud/. 
123 Clare O’Connor, Wal-Mart vs. Amazon:  World’s Biggest E-Commerce Battle Could Boil Down to 
Vegetables, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ clareoconnor
/ 2013/04/23/wal-mart-vs-amazon-worlds-biggest-e-commerce-battle-could-boil-down-to-
vegetables/print. 
124 See Suzanne Allard Levingston, Electronic Health Records’ ‘Make-or-Break Year’, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlook-
electronic-health-records-make-or-break-year (describing the Obama administration’s ef-
forts to introduce a digitally connected health care system). 
125 MYUPMC, https://myupmc.upmc.com (last visited July 22, 2015). 
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medical visits.126  These systems have many advantages for patients 
and medical professionals, and they may represent a great improve-
ment in service delivery and cost control.  But they also fit perfectly 
within the Miller/Smith paradigm:  no Fourth Amendment protection 
when information goes to a third party, such as the web-based health 
portal.  Of course, Congress has created statutory privacy protections, 
through HIPAA.127  But this protection lasts only as long as Congress 
wants it; Congress can repeal the law tomorrow. 
Keep in mind that “medical information” will not only include in-
formation about how many appointments a person may have and 
whether and how the patient pays bills.  Information passed through 
these systems, to physicians, nurses, and other medical service pro-
viders—especially through a system that asks patients to submit their 
symptoms by email and to receive an answer about them same way, 
and to request prescription medicine refills—will mean that the in-
formation about those symptoms and the information about what to 
do about them will enjoy no Fourth Amendment protection.  It is an 
easy thing to draw inferences from this information:  a requested re-
fill for Prozac?  The patient probably has some depression or maybe 
another mental illness.  It helps the doctor and the patient when the 
patient can communicate symptoms and other information to the 
doctor, quickly and efficiently.  But one could imagine a different re-
action—a far less positive one—to the idea that this information has 
no constitutional protection from a government snooping without a 
warrant. 
SOCIAL LIFE AND RELATIONSHIPS—The examples of the ways that 
social life requires submission of information to and through third 
parties keeps growing.  Facebook comes to mind first; with its 1.49 bil-
lion active users,128 it remains the 800-pound gorilla of social media.  
A host of others also fill this space:  Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, and 
any number of smaller entities.  Aside from these are sites for dating 
and romance, such as eHarmony.com, Match.com, Chemistry.com, 
OKCupid.com, Zoosk.com, PlentyofFish.com,129 and even religiously 
 
126 Id. 
127 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
128 Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 1st Quarter 2015 (In Millions), 
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-
users-worldwide/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
129 See, e.g., Kristen Buck, Online Dating Review, Reviews and Comparisons, TOP TEN REVIEWS, 
http://online-dating-review.toptenreviews.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (reviewing the 
qualities of the best online dating sites such as Match.com). 
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oriented sites such as ChristianMingle.com and JDate.com.130  Even 
those interested in adultery have had a site to visit:  
AshleyMadison.com.131  All of these sites oriented to one or another 
kind of social connection operate with either user-generated content 
(Facebook), or by using data supplied by the user to the third party 
to generate a particular result (e.g., the large-database dating sites, 
such as Match.com, eHarmony.com, and OKCupid.com, use data 
submitted by users in answers to online surveys to help create match-
es for patrons).  In every way, social media and sites designed to serve 
a particular social function surely qualify as third parties under Mil-
ler/Smith. 
ENTERTAINMENT—Many entertainment experiences do not re-
quire the transmission of personal data and information to third par-
ties.  One can still pay cash at the box office for a ticket for a movie or 
play or concert, an art exhibit or a sporting event, and enjoy the per-
formance or game (assuming, that is, no need for advance purchases 
or reservations, which could require submission of information, 
probably including credit card numbers, perhaps via the Internet).  
But the largest and fastest growing type of entertainment is often 
quite different.  The video gaming industry is now larger than the 
movie business, with $70.4 billion in worldwide revenue in 2013, 
compared to $35.9 billion in worldwide box office revenue for mov-
ies.132  And while much of that gaming activity may take place in one’s 
home on one’s own equipment, a fast-growing portion of the business 
consists of multiplayer games:  games in which one joins other players 
online, to play against others or in groups.133  For these online activi-
ties, one needs not only a connection to the Internet (the ISP is, it-
self, a third party), but also a set of transactions—registration, pay-
ment, etc.—with the provider of the game.  For this, one must—of 
course—submit information to the game provider. 
 
130 See Christian Reviews, RELIGIOUS DATING, http://www.datingsitesreviews.com/staticpages
/index.php?page= 12 (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing user reviews on religiously 
oriented dating websites). 
131 See Charles Riley, Hackers Threaten to Release Names from Adultery Website, CNN MONEY (July 
20, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/20/technology/Ashley-madison-
hack/ (explaining that the popular online dating website for individuals seeking extra-
marital relationships was hacked). 
132 David Mullich, Who Makes More Money:  Hollywood or the Video Game Industry?, QUORA 
(Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.quora.com/Who-makes-more-money-Hollywood-or-the-
video-game-  industry. 
133 See Anya Kamenetz, Why Video Games Succeed Where the Movie and Music Industries Fail, FAST 
COMPANY (Nov. 7, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021008/why-video-
games-succeed-where-the-movie-and-music-industries-fail (arguing that video games oper-
ate as services rather than products). 
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LEARNING—Parents have always had to give schools some infor-
mation in order to enroll their children and to keep them eligible to 
attend.  Typically, parents submit information concerning the stu-
dent’s resident status in the district, the student’s vaccination and 
other medical records, who to call in case of an emergency, and even 
information on medical issues that could arise on any given day, such 
as allergies, the need for an inhaler, or the like.  But today, at every 
level of the educational process, data on students in the hands of 
schools abounds.  When using software-based learning products, stu-
dents may be recording their competencies, or evidence of learning 
disabilities.134  They may use school computers (e.g., iPads or laptops) 
that take in all manner of personal information.  In higher educa-
tion, the growing presence of online learning—whether in the form 
of courses for students at one particular university, or in the form of 
Massive Open Online Courses (“MOOCs”),135 which can include 
thousands of students all over the world—means that students will, as 
a matter of course, transmit their data to third-parties regularly.  The-
se data may identify students, such as information for purposes of 
registration or payment, or may be the coursework or questions in 
the course.  Whatever it is, the third-party doctrine leaves these data 
without constitutional protection against government intrusion. 
Nevertheless, the third-party doctrine has defenders.  Notably, 
Professor Orin Kerr has defended the doctrine in two articles,136 be-
cause it does no more than ensure a kind of technological neutrality, 
giving the government the same power under the Fourth Amend-
ment vis-à-vis communications networks as it has in the physical 
world.137  Under his analysis, the Smith decision is a way to allow the 
police the same power over a communications network that the po-
lice could wield in the physical world.138  He points out that what 
happens in the home has Fourth Amendment protection, but that 
protection does not cover what happens in public.  He analogizes the 
 
134 Natasha Singer, Uncovering Security Flaws in Digital Education Products for Schoolchildren, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/technology/uncovering-
security-flaws-in-digital-education-products-for-schoolchildren.html?_r=0. 
135 Rachel Fishman, Arizona State to Offer MOOCs for Credit. What Will It Mean for Students?, 
NEW AMERICA ED CENTRAL (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.edcentral.org/global-freshman. 
136 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  A General Approach, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 561 (2009). 
137 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 
517 (13th ed. 2012) (considering the role of the third-party doctrine in monitoring 
communications over networks in comparison to communications within physical space). 
138 Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, supra note 136, at 578. 
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contents of communications—in Smith, what people say during a 
phone conversation—to things happening inside a home; metada-
ta—in Smith, the numbers dialed—is like what happens in public.  
Under the Fourth Amendment, the police could surveil actions in 
public without raising any Fourth Amendment concerns, but they 
would need a warrant to gather data in any way about what happens 
inside a home.  The same should be true in a communications net-
work:  contents (the conversation itself, on the phone; the message 
itself, in an email message) enjoy Fourth Amendment protection, but 
the metadata—equivalent to physical information about who the call-
er interacts with publically—does not.  When the defendant in Smith 
harassed his victim using the telephone system, he could hide himself 
in a way that he could not if the harassment took place in public, 
where police could observe it.139  Using a technological device (the 
pen register) to see who the defendant had called from his phone 
number does no more than a police officer could do by observing the 
defendant walking to his victim’s house to harass her in the physical 
world.140 
Professor Kerr’s argument is certainly logical.  But it fails to deal 
with at least two important things.  First, Smith may be the Supreme 
Court case most people think of today when they discuss the third-
party doctrine, but it was not the only, or even the first, case from the 
Court to set down the doctrine’s parameters.  United States. v. Miller 141 
preceded Smith by three years, and the material in that case that re-
ceived no Fourth Amendment protection went beyond so-called 
metadata (which phone numbers called what others).  Recall that 
Miller created the third-party doctrine in the context of banking, with 
the government seizing the records themselves, including their con-
tents—not just who had these records or who received them.  The 
government captured the defendant’s bank records:  “all records of 
accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of 
Mitch Miller.”142  These items included checks, deposit slips, financial 
statements, and monthly statements.143  In the ruling in Miller that laid 
the groundwork for Smith, the Supreme Court said that “we perceive 
no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their contents . . . . All of the 
documents obtained . . . contain only information voluntarily conveyed 
to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course 
 
139 Id. at 578. 
140 Id. at 577–78. 
141 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
142 Id. at 437. 
143 Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of business.”144  In other words, the Court did not differentiate be-
tween message content and message metadata in Miller; rather, con-
tent had no more Fourth Amendment protection than any “to” or 
“from” information on the documents because the defendant had 
given that content to others, voluntarily.  Thus assuming Professor 
Kerr’s analogy explains Smith, it cannot explain Miller. 
But there is a larger, more important point that tells us that, even 
if we accept Professor Kerr’s justification of Smith, the doctrine re-
mains outdated.  There is, quite simply, an immense difference be-
tween collecting the numbers called by one person from his or her 
telephone, and collecting all of the numbers he or she has called for 
the past year or five years, along with identifying information on all of 
the web sites the person has visited, every physical location visited, 
and all of the photographs and videos the person has taken.  To 
quote Chief Justice Roberts’ in Riley, it is “like saying a ride on horse-
back is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”145  The 
digital world, and the ways in which we can collect, store, analyze, and 
map the ever-growing pile of data produced on each of us every day is 
qualitatively different from what we can observe in the physical world.  
As Justice Sonia Sotomayor said in her concurrence in United States v. 
Jones, the GPS case, the doctrine simply does not fit the digital age.146  
The assembled digital mosaic of our individual lives, contained in any 
smart phone, must receive Fourth Amendment protection, unless we 
would grant our government unlimited access to a detailed record of 
virtually everything we do in our lives, just for the asking.  As Justice 
Sotomayor implies, this just cannot be right, and it is ludicrous to 
think that Americans would simply accept it without question.147 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DISCUSSION OF THE THIRD-PARTY 
DOCTRINE IN RILEY 
In the Riley opinion, the Court discussed the third-party doctrine 
once, and only briefly.148  The Justices spent far more time discussing 
issues that spring from the concerns above:  so much of the infor-
mation we depend upon today finds its way onto the phones that an 
incredibly high percentage of Americans carry with them almost all 
 
144 Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
145 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014). 
146 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
147 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
148 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486. 
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the time.149  These two parts of the discussion might look unrelated, 
but in the end they have much to do with each other. 
The Court’s direct discussion of the third-party doctrine came to-
ward the end of the opinion, in the context of an argument by the 
government that officers seizing a phone should always have the au-
thority to search the phone’s call log without having to obtain a war-
rant.  The authority cited by the government for this proposition was 
Smith v. Maryland, of course, which allowed police to use a pen regis-
ter to obtain the numbers dialed from a particular phone without 
first getting a warrant.150  The Court dismissed the government’s ar-
gument out of hand, because in Smith the Court had “concluded that 
the use of a pen register was not a ‘search’ at all under the Fourth 
Amendment.”151  By contrast, there was no question that in Riley that 
“the officers engaged in a search of [Defendant’s] cell phone.”152  
This statement seems curious indeed.  If Smith is still good law (and 
the Court does not repudiate Smith in Riley), then a search of a 
phone’s data that revealed only the numbers dialed on the phone’s 
call log153 cannot amount to a search for Fourth Amendment purpos-
es, either.  The Court seems to want to have things both ways:  search-
ing data on a smart phone, even just the numbers dialed as listed in 
the call log, is a Fourth Amendment search according to Riley; but 
under Smith, the third-party doctrine says that obtaining the numbers 
dialed using another technology is not a Fourth Amendment search.  
This reveals a conflicted rationale:  on the one hand, wanting the da-
ta on smart phones protected, because of the massive intrusion on 
privacy that warrantless searches of smart phone searches would con-
stitute, and on the other hand not wanting to overrule Smith and the 
third-party doctrine, which has always favored and served law en-
forcement. 
When the Court gets to the larger question of the privacy costs of 
allowing warrantless searches of data on cell phones, however, it takes 
a very broad view.  Smart phones today are “minicomputers” with 
“immense storage capacity”154 that might contain “millions of pages of 
text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos,” not to mention 
 
149 Id. at 2484. 
150 See id. at 2492 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979), for the proposition 
that use of a pen register to record dialed phone numbers was permissible). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 2492–93 (citation omitted). 
153 The Court does say that information, in addition to the numbers dialed, is also available 
on the call logs of most phones.  Id. at 2493.  But this does not answer the question of 
whether or not the log might be viewed only to reveal the numbers dialed. 
154 Id. at 2489. 
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“text messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar,” and other 
treasure troves of personal data.155  Putting all of this information to-
gether gives the government a unique and nuanced picture of an in-
dividual’s life, because the data “reveal much more in combination 
than any isolated record.”156  The browsing data, along with location 
data, the Court said, seem “qualitatively different” in terms of their 
capacity to reveal “private interests or concerns,” such as health, and 
physical whereabouts reconstructed along a precise timeline can 
trace out a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”157  These phones have become so ubiquitous, the 
Court said, that three-quarters of Americans report having their de-
vices within five feet of them most of the time, and 90% of these 
phones contain, “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [their own-
er’s] lives,”158 even surpassing the quantity of records one would typi-
cally find in someone’s entire home.159 
This vast trove of data, much of it highly personal and extremely 
revealing, simply had to have the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment against warrantless searches, the Court said.  The new technol-
ogy of the Internet, and the devices available to us, mean that our old 
assumptions about searching the objects found in the pockets of 
clothing simply do not hold when the object in question is a smart 
phone.  And this new reality, the Court said, does not depend on 
whether the data on the cell phone come directly from inside the 
phone itself, or from a remote storage area —the cloud, in today’s 
common parlance.  It is the nature and quantity of the data accessed 
from the phone that matters, not where the data resides. 
At least in the context of smart phones and other digital devices, 
the application of the Court’s privacy discussion to all data accessible 
from the device amounts to nothing less than an implicit repudiation 
of the third-party doctrine.  Data located in the cloud can only be 
seen as having been conveyed to a third party:  the owner of the serv-
ers on which the data sits.  Thus, without saying so, the Court’s opin-
ion in Riley crosses a long-standing barrier.  Information passed to a 
third party, and accessed remotely from the computers of that third 
party, which would clearly fall on the unprotected side of the Mil-
ler/Smith third-party rule, does have protection under the Fourth Amend-
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 2479. 
157 Id. at 2490 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012)(Sotomayor, J., con-
curring)). 
158 Id. at 2479. 
159 Id. at 2491. 
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ment.  And if that is so, the third-party doctrine has effectively been 
breached, and this may be the beginning of its end.  True, the Court 
inserts a sentence to prop up the doctrine.  But the very mildness of 
that support—just saying that, under Smith, collecting dialed phone 
numbers did not constitute a search and required no warrant – may 
constitute the first faint signal that the Court knows it cannot have 
things both ways.  If the third-party doctrine is correct, data con-
tained on remote servers, accessed by the smart phone user, has no 
expectation of privacy and no Fourth Amendment protection.  If the 
data on remote servers carries an expectation of privacy for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the third-party doctrine can no longer stand 
as it has since the 1970s.  And of these two possibilities, the Supreme 
Court seems to have chosen the latter.  This way of thinking has 
much less in common with the Miller/Smith third-party doctrine’s 
view of privacy than with Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in 
Jones v. United States., in which she described the third-party doctrine 
as  
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of infor-
mation about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily 
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.160 
At bottom, this seeming contradiction comes not as a result of a 
sudden shift of opinion on the Court with regard to privacy.  Rather, 
it comes from a material change in widely available technology.  This 
change is significant enough that it has forced the Court to re-think 
its assumptions about privacy, and other changes must follow.  Fortu-
nately, we have an example to guide us, from the not-too-distant past, 
that will allow us to see what the way forward might look like. 
V.  FROM OLMSTEAD TO KATZ:  HOW ADVANCES IN WIRETAPPING 
FORCED A CHANGE IN THE LAW 
A.  The History of Another Technological Innovation 
To know whether the U.S. Supreme Court might change its view 
of the third-party doctrine, even abandoning it, despite the fact that 
the Court did not do so in Riley, we can look back to the early twenti-
eth century.  By the 1920s, technology available to law enforcement 
had changed:  with the ubiquity of the telephone and telephone ser-
vice, wiretapping had become part of law enforcement’s arsenal.  To-
 
160 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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wards the end of that decade, the Supreme Court had to face the 
question whether using wiretaps without prior judicial approval in the 
form of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Today, the case of Olmstead v. United States161 is chiefly remembered 
for the dissent of Justice Louis Brandeis,162 as he looks ahead to the 
country’s future if the police are allowed to use wiretapping without 
restriction by courts.  Justice Brandeis believed that warrantless wire-
tapping violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the prosecution’s 
use of any evidence gathered through a warrantless wiretap violated 
that constitutional provision.  In the simplest terms, wiretapping con-
stituted lawbreaking.163  Almost ninety years later, judges, scholars, 
and students still quote his dissent. 
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or 
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that, in the 
administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the means—to de-
clare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.164 
Much less remembered, however, is that the majority opinion in 
Olmstead declared that use of a wiretap to gather the contents of a tel-
ephone conversation, when the wiretap did not take place inside the 
home, did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes 
and required no warrant.  According to Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred “unless there 
has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a sei-
zure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical 
invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a sei-
zure.”165  The requirement of “an actual physical invasion” made all 
the difference in the case, because the Fourth Amendment analysis at 
that time turned on whether the defendant had suffered a trespass by 
the government in the gathering of the evidence.  The invention of 
the telephone, the majority said, had upended many of our expecta-
tions and customs. 
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application for 
the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at 
a far distant place.  The language of the Amendment can not be extend-
ed and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world 
 
161 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
162 Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
164 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 466 (emphasis added). 
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from the defendant’s house or office.  The intervening wires are not part 
of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they 
are stretched.166 
What the Fourth Amendment protected, Chief Justice Taft implied, 
was not the conversation itself, but the physical aspect of the home.  
The defendant had a “telephone instrument” installed in the house, 
and then wires carried conversations beyond the house;167 the gov-
ernment intercepted the conversations outside the house, never en-
tering the dwelling – and therefore committing no trespass.  There-
fore, the warrantless wiretap had not violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  Congress, the Chief Justice said, could create legisla-
tion that would make it illegal to use wiretaps outside the confines of 
the home, but the Court could not do this by interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment more broadly.168 
Nearly forty years later, the Court changed course, prompted in 
no small part by new technology.  In Katz v. United States,169 the gov-
ernment charged the defendant with federal offense of transmitting 
“wagering information” over interstate telephone lines.  To prove the 
case, the government introduced not recordings or transcripts of 
conversations about gambling captured through traditional wiretaps, 
but something else:  “evidence of the [defendant’s] end of telephone 
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an elec-
tronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public tel-
ephone booth from which [defendant] had placed his calls.”170  The 
agents had obtained the defendant’s part of the conversations in the 
telephone booth by using a contact microphone:  a microphone ca-
pable of successfully picking up a conversation from inside a tele-
phone booth or an adjacent room, when attached to the other side of 
the wall.171  One of these contact microphones was attached to the top 
of the telephone booths defendant Katz used to discuss gambling and 
bookmaking.  According to the Court of Appeals, which heard the 
case before it went before the Supreme Court, the agents placed the 
microphones “on the tops of two of the public telephone booths 
normally used by the [defendant] . . . with tape.  There was no physical 
 
166 Id. at 465. 
167 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
168 Id. at 465–66. 
169 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
170 Id. at 348. 
171 According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a contact microphone is “a microphone de-
signed to be used in contact with the source of sound or with a resonating or conducting 
surface.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/contact%20microphone. 
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penetration inside of the booths.”172  Technology, it seemed, had advanced 
to the point that microphones outside a structure could capture the 
sound of a person speaking inside the structure. 
It was this last fact upon which the government leaned in its ar-
gument to the Supreme Court.  Capturing the defendant’s side of the 
conversation in the telephone booth did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the government said.173  And this approach made per-
fect sense at the time.  In a ruling which had by then stood for almost 
forty years, the Court in Olmstead had said that the crucial point was 
whether or not a physical trespass had taken place.  Since police had 
installed the wiretap in Olmstead outside the home, with no physical 
invasion, the wiretap without a warrant did not violate the Constitu-
tion.  Naturally, the government reasoned that if they could capture a 
conversation—that is, half a conversation—without invading a consti-
tutionally protected area, its actions in Katz did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, and should therefore stand. 
But in its Katz opinion, the Supreme Court decided that Olmstead 
and the whole idea that a violation of the Fourth Amendment should 
turn on an invasion of property rights had become outmoded.  
Technology had made the rule dangerously obsolete:  constitutional 
protection against only physical violations of places seemed quaint, 
when available devices could change the reality that one usually could 
not hear into a telephone booth without standing close enough to be 
seen.  With new technology, police had no need to stand close, and 
have the bad guy see them; instead, they could tape a contact micro-
phone to the top of the booth and listen from a distance, gathering 
valuable evidence undetected.  This technological change forced the 
Court to change course, and to change the Fourth Amendment’s fo-
cus.  Going forward, the Court said, “the correct solution of Fourth 
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of 
the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’ . . . or the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”174  Instead of looking to the 
physical setting and whether the government had penetrated it, look 
instead to what a person knowingly exposes to the public, versus what 
he seeks to preserve as private.175  The place in which this happens—a 
public telephone booth, a home office, or a public park—constitutes 
a secondary consideration.  In the words of Justice Harlan’s oft-
 
172 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). 
173 Id. at 352. 
174 Id. at 350–51. 
175 Id. at 351. 
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quoted concurring opinion in Katz, “there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”176  Thus the Katz case, and its 
exposure of how new but common technology that made previous 
ways of thinking obsolete, became the occasion for overruling 
Olmstead.  Trespass upon property rights would no longer constitute 
the measuring stick for whether an intrusion into Fourth Amend-
ment territory had occurred; that way of looking at things was simply 
no longer tenable. 
We sit now at a similar point.  The third-party doctrine may once 
have made sense to the Court,177 as basing Fourth Amendment rights 
on trespass law did in 1928.  But widely available technology has pro-
gressed to the point that the assumptions underlying the third-party 
doctrine simply do not fit the world.  The contact microphone could 
capture a conversation inside a closed structure, without penetrating 
it, rendering the requirement for a violation of trespass law unneces-
sary.  The advent of smart phones that can access data remotely, 
which is the way that most data today is stored and accessed, renders 
the third-party doctrine wildly out of step with the world.  Unless 
Americans can say without hesitation that all of their data should be-
come available to the government upon a simple request to a third-
party service provider, without the benefit of warrant issued by a 
judge, things must change.  Our moment today resembles what the 
Supreme Court faced in Katz; the old regime must fall. 
B.  The Way Forward 
What, then, should happen if Riley turns out to be the beginning 
of the end of the for the third-party doctrine?  This is a question any 
critic of the existing structure must face.  After all, law enforcement 
makes wide use of its powers under the third-party doctrine now.  
The question of what, if anything, should take its place looms large, 
when we consider how police must face criminals and conduct inves-
tigations. 
 
176 Id. at 361. 
177 While the third-party doctrine may have made sense to the court at the time, as explained 
above in notes 3–18, supra, I believe it was a mistaken approach and far too broad from 
the very beginning. 
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Various solutions, all of some complexity, have been proposed; all 
take a critical view of the doctrine.178  They all seek an answer to the 
real question:  what protection should our communications with 
third parties, so essential in today’s digital world, enjoy? But with just 
one exception,179 they do not explain how our nation could arrive at 
any new standards. 
The history just reviewed above, from Olmstead to Katz, holds the 
key.  In the Katz era, with its technological advances in wiretapping 
and other listening technologies, an old fashioned response 
emerged:  legislatures, not the Supreme Court, took the lead.  In 
1968, the U.S. Congress revised its antiquated wiretapping law180 and 
passed the Federal Wiretap Act,181 also known as Title III.  The revised 
law directly addressed two major concerns at the time:  “bugging,” the 
use of secret recording technologies in a room or a space to intercept 
“oral communications,” such as the telephone booth in Katz, and the 
interception of private telephone communications (“wire communi-
cations”).  The new law addressed these activities by both government 
and private parties, and required the government to obtain court or-
ders for this activity only if federal agents had probable cause and on-
ly if they could meet a number of further requirements.  If permitted 
by a court order, agents would still face a number of important regu-
lations on how they could conduct these activities.  State legislatures 
also responded, passing wiretapping laws of their own.182  Some of 
 
178 See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD 
PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 153– 54; 156–57; 171; 183– 84 
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008); David Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:  Law En-
forcement Access to Third Party Records: Critical Perspectives from a Technology-Centered Approach 
to Quantitative Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 919 (2014); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the 
(Current) Fourth Amendment:  Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of 
Us, Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States:  
How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information form 
Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006). 
179 Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States, supra note 178, at 373–76. 
180 The old law on wiretapping was part of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). 
181 18 U.S.C. § 2510–2522 (1968). 
182 Ala. Code § 13A-11-30(1); Alaska Stat. §§ 42.40.300(a) & 42.20.310(a)(1); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-3005; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-60-120(a); Cal. Penal Code § 632(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 18-9-303(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-570d(a); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4); 
D.C. Code. Ann. § 23-542(b)(3); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-62; Haw. Rev. Stat. §§803-
42(b)(3) & 711-1111(1)(d); 720 ILS 5/14-2”(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33.5-1-5(2); Iowa 
Code Ann. §§ 727.8 & 808B.2(2)(c); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4001(a)(3) & 21-4002(a)(1); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 526.010; Md. Code Section 10-402.  Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article; Minn. Stat. Ann § 626A.D2 subd. 2(d); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-531(e); Mo. Ann. 
Stat. § 542.402(2)(3)(Supp.); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-702(2)(c); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.620 & 48.077; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:156A-4(d); N.M. Stat. Ann §30-12-
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these state laws were more stringent than the federal law, requiring 
police to jump through additional hoops and limiting police con-
ducting of surreptitious recording in ways that the federal law did 
not.183 
The important point is that, with the third-party doctrine not just 
accommodated to but wiped away, our legislatures would have the 
opportunity—indeed, they would face the necessity—of having the 
kind of conversation about privacy we so badly need.  What digital 
records of citizens should enjoy protection from government surveil-
lance, absent probable cause?  What kind and degree of such surveil-
lance is appropriate when probable cause is present?  Rather than 
failing to protect our digital details simply because they are not secret 
from everyone, our representatives would need to ask “when and how 
should our digital lives be protected, and how should we protect that 
in legislation?”  Whether or not our digital information is secret from 
all third parties is no longer a viable way to look at the question of 
government surveillance, if it ever was.  Rather, the question should 
be what protection for our privacy we, as a society, wish to have. 
CONCLUSION 
The third-party doctrine, which allows the government to obtain 
any information that a person sends to a third party without a war-
rant, has become an open door to government snooping.  For more 
than four decades, under this rule the government has been free to 
get information sent to a third party by a citizen, even if the citizen 
and the third party agree that the information will stay private and 
will only be used for very limited purposes.  In today’s world, with the 
 
1(C)&(E); N.Y. Penal Law §250.00(1); N.C. Gen Stat. § 15A-287(a); N.D. Cent. Code 
§12.1-15-02(3)(c); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.52(B)(4); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 
§176.4(5); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 5704(4); R.I. Gen. Laws §11-35-21(c)(3); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 23A-35A-20(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-601(b)(5); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 16.02(b); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401(2), 76-9-403(1)(a), & 77-23a-4(7)(b); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.030(1)(a); W. Va. Code § 62-1D-3; Wis. Stat Ann. §§ 968.31(c) 
&885.365(1); Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-602(b)(iv). 
183 At least twelve states require more than the Federal Government to allow an interception 
or a recording of a phone call, in terms of the most basic criterion. While the Federal 
Government (and most states, for that matter) require only the consent of one party to 
the conversation to allow interception or recording without a warrant, twelve states re-
quire that both parties to the conversation consent.  Those states include California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.  REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS, REPORTER’S RECORDING GUIDE:  TAPE-RECORDING LAWS AT A GLANCE (2012), 
https://www.rcfp.org/reporters-recording-guide/tape-recording-laws-glance. 
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most personal kinds of information sent to third parties and accessed 
from third parties untold millions of times every day, the third-party 
doctrine has become a distinct danger to the privacy of everyone who 
uses modern communication tools housed in the typical smart 
phone. 
Fortunately, whether intending to or not, the Supreme Court has 
begun to move the law away from the third-party doctrine.  The 
Court’s opinion in Riley does not overrule the Miller or Smith cases, 
but Riley forced the Justices to recognize reality:  if the data in a smart 
phone enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection, so too did data not in 
the phone but accessed from a third party through the phone.  There 
is no practical difference between the two, and in a subsequent case, 
the Court will find the pull to uproot the third-party doctrine too 
much to resist.  That day does not lie far in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
